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NRG Power Marketing, L.L.C. v. Maine Public Utilities Commission,
130 S. Ct. 693 (2010)
The Federal Power Act (hereinafter "FPA") authorizes the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (hereinafter "FERC") to regulate the "sale
of electricity in interstate commerce." Under the Act, "all wholesale
electricity rates must be 'just and reasonable."' The Mobile-Sierra
doctrine creates a rebuttable presumption that "a rate set by a freely
negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the statutory 'just and
reasonable' requirement." In order to rebut the presumption, FERC must
conclude that "the contract seriously harms the public interest."
In 2008, the Supreme Court clarified that the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine applied equally to purchasers and sellers challenging the rate
contracts under the FPA. However, the Morgan Stanley case did not reach
the issue of whether the Mobile-Sierra doctrine extends to rate challenges
by third parties. This term, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the
issue of the relationship between the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and third-
party challenges in NRG Power Marketing v. Maine Public Utilities
Commission. In this case, the Court held that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
does apply to third-party challenges.
NRG Power Marketing arose out of New England's continual
struggle to maintain a reliable energy grid. In 2006, FERC approved a
comprehensive settlement designed to inject stability into the region's
energy market. Of the 115 parties to the negotiation, 107 endorsed the
settlement, which "established rate-setting mechanisms for sales of energy
capacity and provided that the Mobile-Sierra public interest standard
would govern rate challenges." Six of the eight parties who objected to
the settlement petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review. They argued that the
"restrictive" Mobile-Sierra public interest standard should not apply to
them because they were non-party challengers to the rate-setting contract.
Agreeing with the settlement opponents, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
"'when a rate challenge is brought by a non-contracting third party, the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine simply does not apply."'
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine applies to non-contracting parties. The Court rejected the D.C.
Circuit's view that the public interest standard of the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine was separate from and potentially incompatible with the FPA's
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just and reasonable standard. Instead, the Court characterized the public
interest standard as the application of the just and reasonable standard in
the context of rate contracts. Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsberg
stated that "the public interest standard defines 'what it means for a rate to
satisfy the just-and-reasonable standard in the contract context."' Thus,
there is no incongruity between the public interest standard and the just
and reasonable standard because the public interest standard is merely a
particular application of the broader just and reasonable standard.
The Court also determined that the universal application of the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine to all challengers protects the interests of
consumers and third parties. The FPA regulatory regime relies on
voluntary contractual agreements between regulated entities. The
presumption of reasonableness enshrined in the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
protects the sanctity of the contractual relationship, which ultimately
benefits consumers by stabilizing the electricity market. Because this
regulatory system 'contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity,"' contracting parties can
trust the contractual process and take advantage of the stability and
efficiency their agreements bring to the market.
If the Mobile-Sierra presumption applied only to FERC and the
contracting parties, its stabilizing effect would be severely limited. Any
person can complain under the FPA. If those persons are not constrained
by the presumption, then the Mobile-Sierra doctrine affords little in the
way of true protection to the contracting parties. The Court also reasoned
that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine adequately protects third parties. The
doctrine requires FERC to reject any contract rate that "'seriously harms
the consuming public."' The "consuming public" includes third parties
such as the objectors in this case.
The settlement objectors also argued that the rates incorporated
into the settlement agreement were "prescriptions of general applicability
rather than contractually negotiated rates." If this were the case, the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine would not apply. The Supreme Court expressly
declined to reach this issue. "Whether the rates at issue qualify as
'contract rates,' and, if not, whether FERC had discretion to treat them
analogously are questions raised before, but not ruled upon by, the Court
of Appeals. They remain open for that court's consideration on remand."
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Thus, the Court reversed and remanded for additional proceedings
applying the Mobile-Sierra doctrine to the third-party challenge.
KATIE JO WHEELER
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United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 578 F.3d 722 (8th
Cir. 2009)
The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (hereinafter "District")
manages flow and removal of waste water and stormwater for roughly 1.4
million residential and commercial users in the St. Louis, Missouri
metropolitan area. This action arose in June 2007 when the State of
Missouri, jointly with the United States and under federal law, filed an
enforcement action which alleged that from 2000 to 2005 the District
violated permits issued by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources
by permitting the discharge of raw sewage from the District's sewer
system. The plaintiffs alleged that these discharges were the direct
consequence of inadequate flow capacity in the District-managed sewer
collection system, insufficient connections between the sanitary sewer and
stormwater systems, and poor maintenance. The complainants sought
immediate injunctive relief in order to limit the release of untreated
wastewater and sewage in addition to federal civil damages. In its
defense, the District claimed that it was financially unable to comply with
the requirements of the Act, and it filed two counterclaims. Missouri
moved "to strike the District's affirmative defenses and to dismiss its
counterclaims, arguing that they were barred by sovereign immunity and
the Eleventh Amendment." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's denial of Missouri's motion.
Section 309(e) of the Clean Water Act states the following:
Whenever a municipality is a party to a civil action brought
by the United States . . . , the State in which such
municipality is located shall be joined as a party. Such
State shall be liable for payment of any judgment, or any
expenses incurred as a result of complying with any
judgment, entered against the municipality in such action to
the extent that the laws of that state prevent the




The District argued that, as a political subdivision, the Missouri
Constitution expressly limited its authority to unilaterally raise taxes so
that it could generate funds that it would need in order to comply with an
adverse judgment. Therefore, the District claimed, under Clean Water Act
§ 309(e) it was the state's duty to indemnify the District for the costs of
complying with any adverse judgment. Missouri countered that the
District's claims were barred by the State's sovereign immunity and that
this was not waived by joining the federal action because it was required
to under § 309(e) and it had not added any state claims to the complaint.
The court held that Missouri had in fact waived its sovereign immunity.
In reaching its decision, the court noted that "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment provides states with immunity from suit by private citizens in
federal court seeking 'retroactive relief for violations of federal law that
would require payment of funds from a state treasury."' The Eleventh
Amendment itself does not by design automatically strip the federal court
of original jurisdiction, but rather, the defense must be raised. On the
other hand, a state may waive the immunity defense if it voluntarily
invokes federal jurisdiction or files a federal complaint. In the case at bar,
Missouri argued that because § 309(e) compelled it to become a party to
the lawsuit (by requiring that it be joined in any action in which one of its
municipalities is a party), its decision to side with the U.S. as plaintiff was
not in fact a voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity but instead a legal
requirement.
The Eighth Circuit held that Missouri waived its immunity by
electing to align with the U.S. as plaintiff. The court noted that the "filing
of a complaint in a federal district court is the quintessential means of
invoking its jurisdiction." Missouri voluntarily participated with the U.S.
in filing the original complaint against the District; in no way did Missouri
indicate that it was reluctant to join as co-plaintiff, nor did Missouri wait
until it was forced to be joined under § 309(e). In fact, the complaint itself
stated that Missouri filed the action 'at the request and on behalf of the
Missouri Department of Natural Resources."'
The court emphasized that even though Missouri did not raise any
state law claims, it was the State that voluntarily joined the U.S. in
asserting the federal claims, and Missouri was not actually compelled to
join the suit at time of the initial filing. Furthermore, while § 309(e)
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compels a state to become a party, it does not require the state to do
anything that would traditionally constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity, and a state may protect its immunity defense by initially
aligning as a co-defendant with the municipality party and "taking no




American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA. 600 F.3d 624 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA involved a suit challenging the
EPA's authorization of a California rule regulating in-use non-road
engines. Under § 7543(e)(2) of the Clean Air Act, Congress granted
California the principal power to regulate these types of engines. Under
that provision, once California implements a rule and it is approved by the
EPA, other states have only two choices regarding the regulation of in-use
non-road engines: choose to adopt a rule identical to the approved
California rule or choose not to regulate such engines altogether.
California acted pursuant to this provision and adopted a rule which
planned to reduce diesel particulate matter emissions and associated
cancer risks by up to seventy-five percent before 2010. The rule primarily
concerned the operation of transportation refrigeration units (hereinafter
"TRUs"). It forced all TRU vehicles operating in California to comply
with the rule.
The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to approve California's rule.
Under this direction, the EPA must approve the rule as long as three
criterions are met. First, California must have reasonably concluded that
the rule provides at least as much protection as federal standards. Second,
California must need the rule "to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions." Lastly, the rule cannot prevent "other states from deciding to
'adopt and enforce' the California rule." This includes a determination of
the cost of complying with the rule. In 2005, the EPA approved the
California rule under the three criteria.
The nationwide trade association, American Trucking Associations
(hereinafter "Associations"), challenged the EPA's authorization and
approval of the California rule under both the second and third criterion.
The Associations first challenged the EPA's decision under the second
criterion challenging that California did not need the rule for "compelling
and extraordinary conditions." Further, the Associations claimed that the
EPA acted arbitrarily when it interpreted "compelling and extraordinary"
to refer to factors which create pollution.
The Associations also claimed that the third criterion was not met
because the rule had a negative impact on the ability of other states to
follow the regulations set by the rule. The Associations argued that many
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of the trucks across the nation travel through the State of California and
will be subject to the rule, and therefore, the California rule is a de facto
national rule forcing most trucks to comply with the regulations which
"effectively precluded" other states "from declining to follow California's
lead." The Associations also claimed under the third criterion that the
EPA failed to adequately consider the cost of compliance with the
California rule.
The D.C. Circuit reviewed the EPA decision to determine whether
the approval was arbitrary and capricious. With regards to the first claim
by the Trucking Associations, the court determined that the EPA had
much discretion in determining what California's needs. The court
pointed to the fact that California suffers from some of the nation's worst
air quality and concluded that the EPA's determination that California
needed the rule was thus reasonable.
The court next reviewed the third criterion. The court first
explained that the California rule only applies to trucks that have entered
into California and does not force or require any other state to adopt the
rule. The court found that this rule's effect was adequately considered in
the EPA's decision: all the EPA needed to show was that the California
rule applied only in California where California has the authority from
Congress to implement the rule.
The court also stated that all the EPA had to do under the Clean
Air Act was to consider the costs no matter how significant those costs
were. The court concluded that the EPA did so when it determined that
the cost of compliance ranged from $2000 to $5000 per unit.
As a result of this analysis, the court held that the EPA permissibly




Gintis v. Bouchard Transportation Co., 596 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2010)
On April 27, 2003, a fuel barge and tugboat owned by Bouchard
Transportation Co., (hereinafter "Bouchard") strayed off course, went
west of the clearly marked shipping channel, struck a reef, and spilled
approximately 98,000 barrels of fuel oil. The subsequent spill
contaminated ninety miles of the shoreline. Cleanup was initially directed
by a combination of the United States Coast Guard, the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection, and Bouchard. That effort was
later transferred to a "Licensed Site Professional" (hereinafter "LSP")
acting on behalf of Bouchard and supervised by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. The shoreline was divided into 149 segments and each
segment was categorized according to the damage that had occurred. The
cleanup effort was largely successful and led to nearly all affected
shoreline segments being certified clean by August of 2006.
Plaintiffs, a group of waterfront property owners, brought suit in
April 2006 making claims of strict liability, negligence, and common law
nuisance. The district court denied the motion for class certification,
finding that common issues of law and fact did not predominate
throughout the many potential claims. More specifically in regards to the
public nuisance claim, the district court found that, to succeed, the
plaintiffs needed to demonstrate unreasonable interference and special
injury supported by a showing of compensatory damages specific to each
piece of property.
In arriving at its decision, the First Circuit held that, contrary to the
district court's findings, the plaintiffs had presented substantial evidence
of predominating issues and, accordingly, a more searching evaluation
was necessary. Moreover, the court believed that utilization of the public
nuisance standard put forward by the district court-that each plaintiff
must individually show injury, cause, and compensatory amount-would
be contradictory to the intent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
In fact, the court posited that such a standard would nearly eliminate the
possibility of mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster.
Instead, the First Circuit believed that since the focus on remand would
likely be on the sufficiency of common evidence to prove injury,
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causation, and compensatory damages, a crucial common issue of great
importance already existed that was enough to satisfy federal procedural
rules.
Further supporting its holding, the First Circuit noted that if each
individual plaintiff was required to separately litigate her claim, Bouchard
would have to repeatedly litigate the admissibility of the contamination
and cleanup records regarding the spill. In response to Bouchard's
assertion that those records were not even exact enough to serve as
specific proof for many individual parcels and, as a result, lacked
evidentiary adequacy, the court countered that such a contentious
evidentiary problem lent even more credence to the eventual certification
of the class. Judicial inefficiencies, the court implied, were undesirable
not only to Bouchard but also to the courts and those potential plaintiffs
that would find it prohibitively expensive to argue those issues
individually.
After determining that the district court did not adequately evaluate
the contending factual claims, the First Circuit concluded it was not in a
position to certify the class. Instead, the court vacated and remanded the
decision back to the district court for a ruling on certification that gave a




Wolf Recovery Foundation v. United States Forest Service. No. 09-0686-
E-BLW, 2010 WL 672753 (D. Idaho Feb. 19, 2010)
This case arose when the Wolf Recovery Foundation, and other
environmental groups, (collectively, hereinafter "the foundation") sought
to enjoin the U.S. Forest Service and others (collectively, hereinafter "the
government") from using helicopters over forestland in order to dart and
collar gray wolves. The government was darting and collaring the gray
wolves pursuant to the Wolf Conservation and Management Plan, which
was adopted by the Idaho legislature in 2002 in order to monitor the gray
wolf population. The foundation argued that the forestland over which the
helicopters would be operated was protected under the Wilderness Act, an
Act passed in 1964 to protect land "untrammeled by man." And because
the land fell within the Act, the use of helicopters was banned.
In considering the injunction, the District Court of Idaho
acknowledged that the forestland over which the helicopters would be
flying was protected by the Act and that flying helicopters over land
protected by the Act would generally be contrary to the Act; however, the
court noted that the Act allowed banned activities to be excepted from the
Act where the banned activities were "necessary to meet minimum
requirements for the 'administration of the area.'
Although the foundation argued that the use of helicopters by the
government was not necessary to meet the requirements of the
administration of the area and accomplish its goal of tracking and
collaring the gray wolves, the court found that the other methods, such as
using leg-hold traps to capture the wolves, are less humane to the wolves
and would appear to denigrate the forest experience as much as the dart
and tag method that could be utilized with the helicopters. The foundation
also argued that because the gray wolf, which from 1978 to 2009 was
listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "the
ESA"), was no longer endangered, the tagging and collaring of the gray
wolf was unnecessary. The court dismissed the argument because it found
the purpose of the collaring of the wolves was not just to inventory the
number of wolves but also to understand the character and nature of the
wilderness. Because of these reasons, the court found the use of
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helicopters by the government was necessary to meet minimum
requirements for the administration of the area.
The foundation also sought to enjoin the government because it did
not complete either an environmental assessment (hereinafter "EA") or an
environmental impact statement (hereinafter "EIS") required under the
National Environmental Policy Act. The government argued that it was
not required to complete these documents because it fell within two
exceptions to the rule governing the completion of EAs and EISs: (1)
inventories, research activities, and studies limited in context and
intensity; and (2) approval, modification, or continuation of minor special
uses of forestland requiring less than five contiguous acres. The court
agreed with the government, finding that although the use of helicopters
was clearly intense, the use of the helicopters seemed properly limited
under the circumstances so as to fall under the categorical exception.
Finally, the foundation argued that, notwithstanding these facts, the
government's plan amounted to "'destroy[ing] the wilderness in order to
save it."' In addressing this issue, the court noted that the foundation was
making a valid point, but justified its decision to deny the foundation's
injunction because of the limited duration of the proposed helicopter
tagging and collaring and the limited purpose to aid the restoration of a
specific aspect of the wilderness' character. The court also stated that
because it was the limited duration of the plan which saved it from being
enjoined, any subsequent helicopter proposal in the current forestland
would face heightened review because those activities would add to the





Medina County Environmental Action Ass'n v. Surface Transportation
Board, 602 F.3d 687 (5th Cir. 2010)
Vulcan Construction Materials, LP (hereinafter "Vulcan") entered
into long term leases for three adjoining properties within Medina County,
Texas to develop part of this property into a limestone quarry. Vulcan's
plan includes a three phase development structure, with "Phase One"
including the development of 640 acres of land. Phase One is currently
the only phase planned for development. Medina County Environmental
Action Association (hereinafter "MCEAA") challenged as invalid a
Construction and Operation Exemption Decision (hereinafter "the
Decision"), which gives Vulcan the right to construct and operate service
rail line from the quarry, issued by the Surface Transportation Board
(hereinafter "STB"). The STB's Decision was based primarily on facts
laid out in a final Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS")
which the STB had prepared earlier to assess the environmental impacts of
the proposed quarry and rail line. The MCEAA contends that the STB and
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter "FWS") did not
properly comply with its obligations under § 7 of the Endangered Species
Act to ensure that such rail line would not jeopardize the existence of an
endangered species, more specifically the existence of the endangered
golden-cheeked warbler (a species of bird) and certain karst invertebrates.
Initially, a party is to contact the FWS to determine if an
endangered species might be present in the proposed area for development
and if no endangered species is found to be present in the area, then no
further consultation is needed with the FWS. The STB and an
independent third party conducted surveys to determine if any endangered
species were present in the area around the quarry and rail line. Both
found no golden cheeked warblers and only a minute piece of land which
may be possible as a suitable habitat for the bird. Additionally, no suitable
habitat was found for any endangered or threatened karst invertebrates.
However, the MCEAA contends that the STB's Decision was arbitrary
and capricious because the STB and FWS only considered the first phase
of development and did not assess the areas around the other possible
phase's development.
484
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 17, No. 2
Applying a highly differential standard for the STB's Decision, the
court first looked at whether the proposed development of the entire tract
was an interrelated action. The court concluded that development of the
second and third phases was not determinative because the STB was only
called on to approve construction of the rail line. Development of the
second and third phases of the quarry plan had no effect on whether the
rail line would be built and construction of the rail line had no effect on
whether the second and third phases of the quarry plan would be
implemented.
Second, the court concluded that the STB did not act arbitrarily
and capricious when it refused to consider the cumulative and indirect
effects for the development of the entire tract of land, because from the
record it was not considered reasonably certain that Vulcan planned to
develop any other part of the quarry. The court concluded that the STB
had considered all relevant factors and did not act arbitrarily and
capricious in granting its Decision because the STB determined that there
was little to no threat for any endangered species by the development of
the rail line. Additionally, the court noted that the STB had engaged in a
best alternative analysis in preparing the ESI and Decision because,
regardless of the STB's approval for the construction of the rail line,
Vulcan already obtained approval for the development of the quarry and
could transport the mined limestone by truck, which would be more




Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Hobet Mining, L.L.C., No.
3:09-1167, 2010 WL 890972 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 10, 2010)
Three environmental organizations, the Ohio Valley
Environmental Coalition, the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, and
the Sierra Club, have members who use areas along Mud River discharges
for recreation, enjoyment, and business. The organizations brought suit
against Hobet for releasing selenium in amounts above its permits under
the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act
which affected the Mud River area. The organizations claimed that the
discharges caused injury to their members' aesthetic, recreational, and
economic interests.
Hobet brought a motion to dismiss arguing lack of standing,
insufficient Notice of Intent, failure to state a claim, failure to join an
indispensable party, and that the court should not assert jurisdiction under
Younger v. Harris and Colorado River. Further, Hobet moved to
consolidate the claims with a Charleston Division enforcement
proceeding. Because the court thought that the majority of the issues
would be addressed in a motion for summary judgment by the Plaintiffs,
the court only addressed the Plaintiffs' standing.
Under standing precedent, the court stated that the Plaintiffs as an
organization must establish a member has individual standing, the suit is
germane to the organization's purpose, and there is no need for individual
members to directly participate. Further, the court asserted, an individual
must establish "(1) injury in fact, (2) traceability, and (3) redressibility" to
attain standing. Here, the only disputed element of standing was whether
the organizations have a member with sufficient standing to proceed.
The court began with the members' injury in fact finding that the
organizations had members who used the affected area for recreational
purposes, the Defendant violated its water permits, and that any violation
of these water permits were damaging to people who used the water
affected. This was enough to establish injury in fact for the court. The
court then held that there was enough evidence establishing traceability to
the Defendant's permits violations.
Finally, the court addressed the redressibility of the Plaintiffs
claims. It stated that the claims do not need to completely resolve the
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river's selenium levels or bring the levels into an acceptable range in order
to be redressible. Rather, according to the court, a showing of a reduction
in selenium levels would be enough. Specifically under Natural Resource
Defense Counsel, Inc. v. Watkins, the court found that the reduction in
pollution was enough to establish redressibility. Thus, because the
Plaintiffs established all of the elements required for an individual's
standing and the other organizational standing requirements were not




United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 600 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2010)
The Orr Ditch Decree (hereinafter "Decree") allocated water rights
to the Truckee River. The administration of water rights adjudicated in
this Decree is at issue. Plaintiff, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians,
contended that the Nevada State Engineer Ruling 5457 allocating
groundwater adversely affects their water rights given to them under the
Decree. The Tribe appealed a decision by the Nevada State Engineer
(hereinafter "Engineer") to the district court, which determined that it did
not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the Decree only granted
adjudication rights to surface water, not groundwater.
The Decree gave the Tribe the most senior water rights on the
Truckee River. But, in 1998, the Engineer granted to the Tribe the rights
to all the remaining water in the river after all other rights were satisfied.
This grant was based on Nevada state law; not the Decree. The Tribe's
Reservation touches the Tracy Segment Hydrological Basin, and the
Truckee River runs through the basin for about thirty miles. Between
1998 and 2003, there were several applications for new groundwater
allocations. The Tribe opposed these applications because the
groundwater was already fully appropriated. Prior to these applications,
there had been allocations of 7976 acre-feet per year. This was well over
the estimated 6000 acre-feet per year perennial yield, which was
determined by the United States Geological Survey. In order to grant new
allocations, the Engineer estimated the perennial yield to be at 11,500
acre-feet per year. Through this new allocation, the groundwater was no
longer over-appropriated. The Engineer determined that because these
were groundwater allocations, this would not affect the Tribe's surface
water rights in the Truckee River because the groundwater discharge is not
part of the Tribe's water rights. The Engineer insisted that the allocation
of groundwater discharge was not even contemplated in the Decree. Thus,
the Tribe's water rights under the Decree could be diminished by
groundwater allocations without a violation of the Decree.
The court disagreed with the conclusions of the Engineer. The
court recognized that while there was nothing in the Decree protecting the
Tribe's specific rights from diminution of the flow of groundwater, the
Decree was "intended to fulfill the purpose of the United States in
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withdrawing land from the public domain for the Tribe's reservation and
setting aside 'a reasonable amount of water' for use on the reservation." It
would be inconsistent with this purpose to allocate groundwater at the
expense of the Tribe. The court stated that the proper interpretation of the
Decree was to prevent the senior water rights granted to the Tribe from
being allocated to others, including both the surface water and
groundwater.
The court then turned to the district court's determination that it
lacked jurisdiction. A Nevada statute indicates that "on stream systems
where a decree of court has been entered, the action must be initiated in
the court that entered the decree." Thus, the court stated, an allocation of
water rights that diminishes the rights granted to the Tribe by the Decree is
allowed appellate review in the court that entered the Decree. The Decree
was entered by the Federal Court for the District of Nevada. Thus, the
district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Tribe's appeal.
The court then limited the district court's jurisdiction in holding
that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the Tribe's appeal to
the extent that it might adversely affect the Tribe's rights under the
Engineer's 1998 ruling based on state law that gave the Tribe the
remaining water rights.
In the end, the court held that the Tribe's rights under the Decree
may not be adversely affected by allocations of groundwater in the basin.
Also, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Tribe's
appeal from the Engineer's Ruling insofar as the additional allocations of




Conservative Congress v. United States Forest Service, No. 09-16182,
2010 WL 926078 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2010)
The United States Forest Service (hereinafter "Forest Service")
planned a forest thinning project which would cover 931 acres in the
Shasta-Trinity National Forest, in an attempt to make the forest more
resilient to wildfire. The Forest Service completed an environmental
assessment of the project and determined that there would be no
significant impact, and therefore, approved the project to move forward.
The Plaintiffs, Conservation Congress, Citizens for a Better Forestry, and
a couple of individuals, challenged the forest thinning project as violative
of the National Forest Management Act (hereinafter "NFMA") and the
National Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter "NEPA"). The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, and the
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The court first examined the Plaintiffs' NFMA challenges. The
Pacific fisher, which has been classified as a sensitive species, lived in the
Shasta-Trinity National Forest. The Shasta-Trinity National Forest has a
Land and Resource Management Plan (hereinafter "LRMP") that sets a
habitat capability model for the Pacific fisher. The Plaintiffs argued that
under the LRMP, the Forest Service was required to directly monitor not
only the fisher habitat but also directly monitor the fisher population. The
court noted that the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly approved of the Forest
Service using the amount of habitat that is suitable for a particular species
as a measure of sustainability for that species and as a measure of the
species population. Additionally, the LRMP only requires management to
average moderate levels of habitat capability. There was no specific
evidence that the changes that would result from the thinning project
would change the population trend of the fisher or that the current habitat
capability levels would not change after the project. Further, the Plaintiffs
failed to show that the Forest Service did not rely on the best scientific
data available in making its determination. Thus, the court held that the
Plaintiffs failed to show that these findings were arbitrary and capricious.
Plaintiffs also argued that the Forest Service's use of habitat
components to monitor management indicator assemblages violated the
NFMA's diversity requirement and requirement to monitor the impacts of
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site specific projects on management indicator species. However, in this
case, there were no identified indicator species. In the absence of
indicator species, the LRMP allowed the Forest Service to use habitat
components to represent the assemblages, and the NFMA does not require
the Forest Service to verify its prediction regarding observation or on the
ground analysis. Therefore, the court found that the Forest Service
complied with the NFMA analysis.
The court next turned to the challenges raised under the NEPA.
The Plaintiffs challenged that the Forest Service did not adequately
disclose the thinning project's impact on several sensitive, threatened or
endangered species or on the water quality within the project area. This
challenge was based on the contention that the Forest Service had a duty
to monitor species populations, but the court stated that it did not have
such a duty. Additionally, the Forest Service conducted an analysis of the
thinning project and the measures that it would take to minimize any
potential negative impacts the project would have on the environment.
The court held that the environmental analysis that the Forest Service
conducted constituted adequate disclosure of the project and its potential
impacts.
The Plaintiffs also stated that the Forest Service should have filed a
supplemental NEPA analysis of environmental impacts on the area from
previous logging activity, but the court held that the information from the
previous activity was not significant to this project, and thus not filling a
supplement was not clear error.
After determining that the Forest Service did not violate the
NFMA or the NEPA, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
the ruling of the district court in favor of the Forest Service.
DANIELLE HOFMAN
491

